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TRANSFER PRICING SOLUTIONS 
IN THE GLOBAL ECONOMY* 
SANDRA REID ROBERTSON" 
I. INTRODUCTION 
As the world marches at a furious pace toward a truly 
global economy, the issues inherent in establishing transfer 
pricing across international borders and the related interna-
tional tax consequences of those transactions become more 
important. Corporations continue to diversify and become mul-
tinational and existing multinational companies expand their 
holdings; consequently, the "opportunities" for double taxation 
increase. 1 Double taxation occurs when two or more countries 
tax the same income.2 When discrepancy exists as to which of 
two related companies has earned taxable income, both coun-
tries may tax the same income. Multinational companies often 
attempt to minimize their global tax burdens by "setting" pric-
es for goods and services which reduce the target government's 
tax base.3 Taxing jurisdictions are losing tremendous amounts 
of revenue because of corporate manipulation of transfer pric-
ing.4 Some economists even suggest that the ability to manipu-
* Edited by Pamela K Kayfetz, J.D. 1994, LL.M. (Tax) 1995, LL.M. 
(International Legal Studies) 1996, Golden Gate University School of Law; M.B.A 
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1. Robert G. Clark, Transfer Pricing, Section 482, and International Tax Con-
flict: Getting Harmonized Income Allocation Measures from Multinational Cacopho-
ny, 42 AM. U. L. REV. 1155, 1157 (1993). 
2. Id .. 
3. Richard L. Kaplan, International Tax Enforcement and the Special Chal-
lenge of Transfer Pricing, 1990 U. ILL. L. REV. 299, 300. 
4. Charles F. Connolly, Comment, The New Transfer Pricing and Penalty Reg-
177 
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late transfer prices is a major reason for the existence of multi-
national enterprises.5 
Transfer pricing adjustments can be made by tax authori-
ties when they disagree with income allocations between two 
or more related entities, as is often the issue in component 
pricing situations.6 However, countries must balance the con-
siderations of protecting their domestic tax base with the inter-
ests of their citizens in avoiding double taxation. Attempts to 
correct inequities and abuse in one area, such as tax base 
erosion, can have the collateral consequence of double taxation 
of domestic entities. In other words, if the United States, for 
example, takes an aggressive posture in transfer pricing issues 
relative to a United States subsidiary of a foreign parent, it is 
simultaneously subjecting that domestic subsidiary to potential 
double taxation. 
The world community has attempted to eliminate double 
taxation, primarily through tax exemptions and tax credits, 
where in one form or another an entity is "given credit" for tax 
paid in a foreign jurisdiction on certain income.7 In addition, 
tax treaties between specific countries attempt to address and 
eliminate double taxation. However, certain gaps exist and 
impasses are encountered even with a valid treaty procedure.8 
All United States tax treaties, except the one with Ireland, 
contain competent authority9 procedures. 1o These procedures 
ulations: Increased Compliance, Increased Burdens, and the Search for a Safe Har· 
bor, 16 U. PA. J. INT'L Bus. L. 339, 341 (1995). 
5. Roger Gordon & Jeffrey Jackie-Mason, Why Is There Corporate Taxation in 
a Small Open Economy? The Rule of Transfer Pricing and Income Shifting (Na-
tional Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper No. 4690, 1994). 
6. Clark, supra note 1, at 1157. 
7. OECD Report on Fiscal Affairs and Multinational Enterprises 7 (1979) 
[hereinafter OECD Report]. The Organization for Economic Cooperation & Develop-
ment [hereinafter OECD] defines double taxation as: "inclusion of the same income 
in the tax base by more than one tax administration." OECD Report, supra. 
8. See James R. Mogle, Competent Authority Procedure, 23 GEO. WASH. J. 
INT'L L. & ECON. 725, 725 (1990). 
9. The term "competent authority" has two meanings when used in this con-
text. It means both the jurisdiction and legal authority to deal with a particular 
problem and the person ("Competent Authority") in a particular jurisdiction vested 
with the power to effect the competent authority process. This author will address 
both the person ("Competent Authority") and the competent authority process and 
make every attempt not to confuse the reader. 
10. Michael G. Brandt & Mark H. French, Revised Competent Authority Pro-
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provide a means of contesting actions by one of the treaty 
partners which would result in taxation not in accord with the 
treaty provisions. ll The competent authority procedures are 
time-consuming, cumbersome, and many times avoided by 
taxpayers truly in need of relief of double taxation. 12 This pa-
per will provide a brief history of the problems which transfer 
pricing issues have caused for both international companies 
and taxing jurisdictions. It will also examine efforts by the 
United States tax system to remedy this two-sided problem. 
The United States has primarily attempted to deal with the 
problem from its fiscal perspective, the underpayment of Unit-
ed States income tax by foreign companies through transfer 
pricing abuse. The double taxation problem for taxpayers has 
an effective, albeit cumbersome, solution in the competent 
authority process. However, the very fact that double taxation 
problems still exist, suggests the need for more effective dis-
pute resolution methods between the taxing jurisdictions and 
the related taxpayers, whether it be the existing competent 
authority procedure or new methods. Potential long term solu-
tions to these transfer pricing problems will also be examined. 
II. THE TRANSFER PRICING DILEMMA 
Transfer pricing manipulation often results in income 
which is taxable under United States law escaping U.S. taxa-
tion. Unrelated companies dealing "at arm's length" set their 
cedures Expand Availability but More Guidance is Needed, 83 J. TAX'N 223, 223 
(1995) (Competent authority procedures are mutual agreement procedure articles of 
treaties that provide means of resolving disputes that would result in taxation not 
in accordance with the treaty, i.e. double taxation. The treaties allow the taxpayer 
to present its case to the Competent Authority of the country of residence. If the 
resident's Competent Authority believes the allegation is justified and cannot re-
solve the case, it may present the case to the Competent Authority of the treaty 
partner. The two Competent Authorities will then attempt to resolve the dispute.). 
11. Dianne K Kanakis, International Tax Planning for the U.S. Multinational 
Corporation· Competent Authority, 270 PRACTICING LAw INSTITUTE, TAX SERIES 
339, 339 (1988) (Since 1971 cases processed through the Competent Authority total 
approximately 1,100. Over 900 of those cases have been closed. Despite difficulties 
in negotiating across international boundaries, over 70 percent of the cases closed 
received partial or full relief from double taxation. Competent Authority cases in 
the United States as of 6/30/87 approximated 260. Over 83 percent of these were 
allocation cases.) 
12. Id .. 
3
Robertson: Transfer Pricing in the Global Economy
Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1996
180 ANNUAL SURVEY OF INT'L. & COMPo LAW [Vol. 3:1 
prices in accordance with market forces,13 causing tax liabili-
ties to fall naturally in the appropriate jurisdictions. Converse-
ly, since related companies have no such need to compete with 
each other, they can set pricing levels between themselves to 
minimize their overall tax burden. 14 Depending on the loca-
tion of a tax haven jurisdiction, as well as any concerns compa-
nies may have regarding their domestic tax base(s), companies 
can manipulate transfer prices to their overall benefit. For 
instance, a company that benefits, overall, from the increased 
profitability of a subsidiary does not have any incentive to 
charge that subsidiary a fair "arm's length price"15 for the 
goods or services sold. Internal Revenue data show that in 
1986 foreign-owned business in the United States had gross 
income in excess of $500 billion and reported aggregate tax 
liability of negative $1 billion.16 
One situation where transfer pncmg can be improperly 
used to reduce overall tax payments by related companies is 
the hypothetical case of a foreign parent corporation which 
maintains a wholly owned manufacturing subsidiary located in 
the United States and supplies that subsidiary with component 
parts to assemble the final product. 17 If the parent is located 
in a more favorable tax jurisdiction, then it can reduce its 
overall tax burden by manipulating the price it charges the 
subsidiary for the component parts. The parent can virtually 
avoid or evade any tax liability in the United States by setting 
the component price it charges the subsidiary so high that the 
subsidiary, despite its productivity, can do no better (at least 
for U.S. tax base purposes) thim break even. With little or no 
13. Clark, supra note 1, at 1160. 
14. MERTENS LAw OF FED. INCOME TAX'N § 451.01 (1995) [hereinafter 
MERTENS] (Tax considerations which might influence a controlled group's incentive 
to shift income away from or to a particular jurisdiction include effective tax rates, 
availability of tax holidays, timing considerations which might allow significant de-
ferral of income, effectiveness of tax administration and enforcement in the juris-
diction, and withholding rates applicable to distributions of earnings or royalties). 
15. Clark, supra note 1, at 1164-66. 
16. 136 CONGo REC. H928 (daily ed. Mar. 20, 1990) (remarks of Rep. Dan 
Rostenkowski, Chairman of the House Ways and Means Committee, upon introduc-
tion of The Foreign Tax Equity Act of 1990); see also Daily Tax Rep. (BNA), Feb. 
14, 1990, at G-2 (foreign-owned car makers paid federal income tax of .00166% of 
United States assets). 
17. Clark, supra note 1, at 1164. 
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taxable income in the United States, the subsidiary pays little 
or no U.S. tax, even though true value was added in the Unit-
ed States and income tax liability should be paid in this juris-
diction. Is 
The repatriation of income to a foreign parent is only one 
of three facets of the transfer pricing problem.I9 The manipu-
lation of transfer pricing also causes problems in expatriation 
of income to a foreign affiliate, and two-way transfers of intan-
gible property.20 This article emphasizes the repatriation of 
income perspective. 
III. PAST U.S. ENDEAVORS TO ADDRESS THE TRANSFER 
PRICING PROBLEM 
The Commissioner of Internal Revenue has had the au-
thority to allocate income and deductions among affiliated 
entities since 1917.21 The 1928 Revenue Act significantly ex-
panded this reallocation power to determine the related 
entities' "true tax liability.,,22 The United States' primary ad-
ministrative tool in addressing transfer pricing issues, in rela-· 
tion to both international and domestic transactions, is Inter-
nal Revenue Code § 482.23 This broad section permits the In-
ternal Revenue Service (hereinafter I.R.S. or Service) to reallo-
cate income and deductions between and among entities which 
are controlled either directly or indirectly by the same inter-
ests, if this allocation is necessary to prevent evasion of tax or 
to reflect clearly the true income of the entities.24 
The Commissioner increased efforts under § 482 in the 
foreign arena beginning in 1960 with the adoption of an accel-
erated International Enforcement Program to scrutinize ar-
18. [d. at 1165. 
19. [d. at 1164. 
20. [d. at 1165. 
21. Regulation 41, Articles 77-78, War Revenue Act of 1917, Ch. 63, 40 Stat. 
300 (1917). 
22. H.R. Rep. No.2, 70th Cong., 1st Sess. 16-17 (1928). 
23. LR.C. § 482 (West 1996) [hereinafter LR.C. § 482]. 
24. Treas. Reg. § 1.482-1(a)(1) as amended in 1994 reads: "The purpose of sec-
tion 482 is to ensure that taxpayers clearly reflect income attributable to con-
trolled transactions, and to prevent the avoidance of taxes with respect to such 
transactions." 
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rangements between U.S. taxpayers and their related foreign 
entities.25 
Historically, the Internal Revenue Service has encountered 
substantial difficulties in reallocating income under § 482.26 
Evidentiary problems abound.27 As foreign multinationals 
have become more sophisticated in setting transfer prices and 
disguising controlled entities, the efforts by the I.R.S. and 
Congress have intensified. 
In the early 1960's, the United States officially adopted the 
traditional arm's length standard approach in dealing with 
transfer pricing issues and persuaded the rest of the world to 
follow. 28 In 1979, the Organization for Economic Cooperation 
& Development Committee, the United Nations, and the Unit-
ed States adopted model conventions addressing transfer pric-
ing adjustments and the use of the arm's length standard.29 
None of these ,model conventions, however, provides the meth-
ods for determining the arm's length price. The factual deter-
mination of an arm's length price is, of course, essential if 
proper allocation adjustments are to be made. The difficulty of 
determining an arm's length price is one of the principal rea-
sons for the complexities of identifying and correcting abuses 
in transfer pricing. 
Increased concern for tax base losses prompted Congress 
to revisit the transfer pricing issue in the Tax Reform Act of 
1986,30 and to begin to address the problems related to trans-
fers of intangible assets. Recent efforts in the transfer pricing 
25. MERTENS, supra note 14, at § 451.45. 
26. The OECD recognizes that "in many cases, there may be a genuine diffi-
culty in accurately determining (an arm's length) price." DEeD Transfer Pricing 
Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises and Tax Administrations Discussion Draft, 
Part I, 94 TAX NOTES TODAY 133-38, July 11, 1994, 'lI18. 
27. Roundtable Discussion in International Taxation with D. Kevin Dolan, Ste· 
ven E. Shay, and David R. Tillinghast, 61 TAX NOTES 1119, 1121 (1993). 
28. Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, The Rise and Fall of Arm's Length: A Study in the 
Evolution of U.S. International Taxation, 15 VA. TAX REV. 89, 90 (1995). 
29. ORGANIZATION FOR ECONOMIC COOPERATION & DEVELOPMENT COMM. ON 
FISCAL AFFAIRS, TRANSFER PRICING AND MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES 7 (1979). 
30. Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, § 1231 (c)(1), 100 Stat. 2085, 
2562-63 (codified at 26 U.S.C. § 482 (1988». 
6
Annual Survey of International & Comparative Law, Vol. 3 [1996], Iss. 1, Art. 8
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/annlsurvey/vol3/iss1/8
1996] TRANSFER PRICING IN THE GLOBAL ECONOMY 183 
area, including the White Paper and the Advance Pricing Pro-
cedures, will be discussed later in some detail. 
IV. CURRENT U.S. LAW 
I.R.C. § 482 provides that: 
In any case of two or more organizations, trades, 
or businesses (whether or not incorporated, 
whether or not organized in the United States, 
and whether or not affiliated) owned or con-
trolled directly or indirectly by the same inter-
ests, the Secretary may distribute, apportion, or 
allocate gross income, deductions, credits, or 
allowances between or among such organiza-
tions, trades, or businesses, if he determines 
that such distribution, apportionment or alloca-
tion is necessary in order to prevent evasion of 
taxes or clearly to reflect the income of any of 
such organizations, trades, or businesses. In the 
case of any transfer (or license) of intangible 
property, the income with respect to such trans-
fer or license shall be commensurate with the 
income attributable to the intangible.31 
This deceptively simple Code section is particularly diffi-
cult to administer. The I.R.S. must determine that a sufficient 
relationship exists between two entities to subject them to the 
provisions of § 482. Companies which are owned directly or 
indirectly by the same interests are subject to the provisions of 
§ 482.32 Ownership is primarily a factual determination and 
thus easier to ascertain than the accompanying provision of 
§ 482 which provides the power for the I.R.S. to reallocate 
income between and among companies which are "controlled," 
either directly or indirectly, by the same interest. The regula-
tions provide that "control" includes any kind of control, 
whether legally enforceable and however exercised.33 It is the 
reality of the control which is decisive, not the form. 34 More-
31. I.R.C. § 482. 
32. Id .. 
33. Treas. Reg. § 1.482·1(a)(3) (1995). 
34. Treas. Reg. § 1.481-l(b)(l), as amended in 1994 reads: "In determining the 
true taxable income of a controlled taxpayer, the standard to be applied in every 
case is that of a taxpayer dealing at arm's length with an uncontrolled taxpayer." 
7
Robertson: Transfer Pricing in the Global Economy
Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1996
184 ANNUAL SURVEY OF INT'L. & COMPo LAW [Vol. 3:1 
over, a presumption of control arises if income or deductions 
have been arbitrarily shifted.35 Certain foreign corporate 
structures may exhibit the requisite control but, because of 
difficulties in getting sufficient evidence to establish such con-
trol, escape domestic taxation and attempts made under § 482 
to reallocate income. 
In order to raise a § 482 issue and prevail In potential 
litigation, the Service must know: 
1. The details of the questioned transactions as they actu-
ally happened; 
2. The functions which were performed to accomplish the 
transactions; 
3. Which organization performed each function (functional 
analysis); and 
4. The method or basis upon which the intercompany 
charge was made, or not made, by the taxpayer.36 
If the Service believes it has sufficient evidence to propose 
an adjustment authorized by I.R.C. § 482, the Service may 
assign a "price," used only for allocating taxable income, that 
would reflect what the same transferor would have charged an 
unrelated third party. The Internal Revenue Regulations re-
garding I.R.C. § 482 state that the purpose of § 482 is to place 
a "controlled taxpayer on a tax parity with an uncontrolled 
taxpayer.,,37 This regulation further provides that the stan-
dard to be applied in seeking such parity is that of a taxpayer 
dealing at arm's length with an uncontrolled taxpayer.3S Al-
though the regulations provide for several methods of deter-
mining an arm's length price for purposes of reallocating in-
35. The final regulations offer more guidance and flexibility than the earlier 
temporary regulations. See Robert D. Hasley, Jr., U.s. Sets New Tax Rules on 
Pricing, N.Y. TiMES, July 5, 1994, at D3. 
36. MERTENS, supra note 14. 
37. Treas. Reg. § L482-1(a)(1) (as amended by T.D. 8552, 59 Fed. Reg. 34,971, 
(July 8, 1994)). 
38. Treas. Reg. § L482-l(b). 
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come, all are problematic.39 Since the three traditional arm's 
length pricing methods have been ineffective in numerous 
cases, the courts have come to rely on "fourth methods," a 
labor-intensive, case-by-case basis.40 
v. RECENT U.S. EFFORTS TO SOLVE TRANSFER PRIC-
ING ISSUES 
The Tax Reform Act of 1986 initiated the most recent 
efforts to deal with transfer pricing issues. The addition of the 
last sentence of § 482 signals the new emphasis on the particu-
lar problems associated with intangibles in transfer pricing; it 
provides that the income attributable to an intangible asset 
shall be determined in a manner that is "commensurate with 
the income" from that asset. The traditional arm's length stan-
dard attempts to correct the problem on a case-by-case basis. 
The commensurate with income standard goes to the root of 
the problem in reallocating the income retrospectively.41 It 
signals a new direction in chasing the tax dollars attributable 
to transfer pricing manipulation. 
In acknowledging both the inherent problems in transfer 
pricing and the particular problem with intangible assets, the 
Internal Revenue Service conducted an intensive study of 
transfer pricing issues. The results of this study are known as 
the "White Paper."42 The Service interviewed its International 
Examiners to determine what difficulties they were encounter-
ing in administering the law. This study concluded that the 
International Examiners had significant problems obtaining 
access to relevant information to make pricing determina-
tions. 43 Most taxpayers were unable to or simply did not pro-
vide the information necessary to determine how their inter-
company pricing was established. Although administrative 
summons and formal document request procedures are avail-
able to examiners in attempting to obtain the necessary infor-
39. Clark, supra note 1, at 1169 (The principal pricing methods that are used 
are the comparable uncontrolled price, resale price, and cost plus methods.). 
40. Id. at 1174. 
41. Id. at 1179. 
42. A Study of Intercompany Pricing Under Section 482 of the Code, I.R.S. 
Notice 88-123, 1988-2 C.B. 458, 459. 
43. Id. at 461. 
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mation from foreign taxpayers, for numerous reasons these 
tools have not produced the required evidence. As one result of 
the White Paper, Congress enacted stringent penalties to aid 
in the enforcement of the law.44 
One significant attempt to solve the transfer pricing issue, 
which arose as a result of the White Paper, was the advent of 
Advance Pricing Agreements, or AP.As.45 In 1991, the Ser-
vice proposed an advance pricing procedure46 whereby the 
taxpayer can suggest a transfer pricing method in advance, 
and if the Service agrees, the taxpayer can use the method 
approved for establishing transfer pricing, with no fear of a 
§ 482 adjustment.47 The AP.A is a binding agreement be-
tween the taxpayer and the I.R.S .. The competent authorities 
of the two relevant jurisdictions may enter the proceedings but 
are not required to do SO.46 The Service hoped that this pro-
spective solution would encourage corporations to obtain 
AP.As, thus reducing both the Service's and the taxpayer's 
costs involved in litigating this issue. Reviews as to the 
A.P.A.'s effectiveness, however, have been mixed. 49 
The AP.A procedure is very complicated and costly to the 
taxpayer.50 In addition, AP.As are not published and are of 
no precedential value. These facts lead to the impression that 
I.R.S. is "cutting deals" with large corporate taxpayers. 51 De-
spite the cumbersomeness of the process, AP.A procedures do 
44. Transfer Pricing Penalty Documentation Rules Eased for Some Years, 5 J. 
INT'L TAX'N 287 (1994) (A 20% substantial valuation misstatement penalty is im-
posed under § 6662(e)(I)(B) when a transfer price of a related party transaction is 
200% or more, or 50% or less, than the correct price determined under § 482. The 
penalty is 40% for a gross valuation misstatement under § 6662(h)(2), which has 
thresholds of 400% and 50%.). 
45. Avi-Yonah, supra note 28, at 154. 
46. Rev. Proc. 91-22, 1991-1 I.R.B. 526. 
47. Id .. 
48. Id .. 
49. See e.g., Peter A. Glicklich & Seth B. Goldstein, Changes in U.S. Transfer 
Pricing Regulations Increase Compliance Burdens for Multinationals and Up the 
Ante in Transfer Pricing Disputes, 41 CAN. TAX. J. 382, 386 (1993); Steven P. 
Hannes, IRS 1994 Transfer Pricing Rules Reward Planning and Documentation, 
Increase Penalty Risks, 94 TAX NOTES TODAY, Aug. I, 1994, available in LEXIS, 
Fed. Tax Library, TNT File. 
50. Avi-Yonah, supra note 28, at 154. 
51. Id. at 155. 
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hold some long-term hope for providing solutions to the trans-
fer pricing issues, particularly in specific industries. In fact, 
the major transfer pricing cases probably arise with a limited 
number of taxpayers. The top 350 multinational corporations 
control about a third of the world's productive resources. 52 
These companies are likely to account for the vast majority of 
transfer pricing cases in the United States. 53 
VI. DIFFICULTIES IN APPLICATION OF § 482 TO FOR-
EIGN COMPANIES: THE JAPANESE EXAMPLE 
In addressing transfer pricing issues, the United States 
has encountered more problems applying § 482 to companies 
affiliated with certain foreign jurisdictions than others. The 
inherent problems in determining the validity of international 
transfer pricing and in reaching agreeable solutions for all 
three parties involved have been exacerbated by cultural differ-
ences as well. 
In contrast to the United States, for example, Japan, de-
spite statutory prohibition, tacitly encourages monopolies in its 
markets.54 From an American viewpoint, Japan inadequately 
enforces anti-monopoly policy particularly in regard to the 
Japanese corporate phenomenon known as the keiretsu.55 
Each keiretsu is an amorphous network of related compa-
nies centered around one "parent" company or bank, . and es-
sentially monopolizes segments of the Japanese economy. 56 
Although one may find traditional corporate ownership or 
partial ownership occasionally, most members are bound to the 
keiretsu by an "almost transparent interlinking of Japanese 
companies.,,57 This is accomplished by interlocking director-
52. Marc M. Levey, et al., Japan's Pricing System is Evolving Along U.s. 
Lines, 4 J. INT'L TAX'N 407 (1993): "President Clinton's call for additional 235 
agents specifically to review transfer prices represents a more explicit example of 
this intention to reduce transfer pricing abuses." Levey, et al., supra, at p. 413 
53. Avi-Yonah, supra note 28, at 155. 
54. Gregory K. Bader, Note, The Keiretsu Distribution System of Japan: Its 
Steadfast Existence Despite Heightened Foreign and Domestic Pressure for Dissolu-
tion, 27 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 365, 365 (1994). 
55. ELEANOR M. HADLEY, ANTITRUST IN JAPAN 257 (1970). 
56. Bader, supra note 54, at 366. 
57. Id. at 372. 
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ates, presidential councils, group-member shareholding, lend-
ing preferences, few intra-group competitors, and intra-group 
grading. 58 
Following World War II, the United States initiated disso-
lution of the large scale monopolies then existing in Japan, 
known as zaibatsu.59 Long term solutions to thwart the possi-
ble re-emergence of monopolies were to be effected by the 
Antimonopoly Act.60 This Act was based on two American 
models - the Sherman Act and Clayton Act - and prohibited the 
formation or existence of private monopolies and the unreason-
able restraint of trade.61 The Japanese did not adopt in prac-
tice the Antimonopoly Act since the Act's basic tenets were not 
customary in usually monopolistic Japanese markets, where 
the significant economic benefits to be gained from related 
company transactions and overall economies of scale were 
recognized. Several amendments to the Act through 1953 
carved exceptions to the Act's stringent provisions and present-
ed the opportunity for former zaibatsu members to reunite and 
become the current-day keiretsu.62 The keiretsu obtained con-
trol over the companies within their "family" through one of 
two keiretsu structures - central bank keiretsu or distribution 
keiretsu.63 The central bank keiretsu form around banks that 
benefit keiretsu members through the provision of easily at-
tainable loans, reduced interest rates, and access to distribu-
tion systems. A trading company associated with the bank 
handles the distribution of group member products. This struc-
ture yields a horizontal grouping of large firms in various mar-
kets. The six largest central bank keiretsu control over half of 
the largest corporations in Japan, including its electronics and 
automotive industry.64 
The other type of keiretsu is organized around a substan-
tial company rather than a bank. The central company is the 
58. MICHAEL L. GERLACH, THE KEIRETSU: A PRIMER 8 (1992). 
59. Hadley, supra note 55, at 367. 
60. Act Concerning Prohibition of Private Monopoly and Maintenance of Fair 
Trade, No. 54 (1947) (amended on July 23, 1982). 
61. Bader, supra note 54, at 369. 
62. [d. at 370. 
63. [d .. 
64. [d. at 371. 
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primary purchaser of group member products. These keiretsu 
which are organized vertically can monopolize entire industries 
from manufacturing to retai1.65 The two types of keiretsu are 
not mutually exclusive and interlocking keiretsu of both types 
provide even greater opportunities for member benefits.66 Al-
though the Antimonopoly Act was again amended in 1977, its 
provisions have done little to disband the keiretsu structure.67 
The keiretsu structure in Japan with either direct or indi-
rect control across various group members provides a fertile 
ground for income and expense allocation abuse as addressed 
in I.R.e. § 482. In the event that a controlled entity is owned 
outright by a Japanese parent company, control is easily estab-
lished. Unfortunately for the United States income tax admin-
istrators, that is usually not the case. The threshold question 
that must be answered affirmatively before § 482 reallocations 
can be made is whether a related entity is "controlled" either 
directly or indirectly by another. Partly as a result of the exist-
ing Japanese Antimonopoly Act (albeit often unenforced) and 
partly as a result of the Japanese culture itself, establishing 
control sufficient to effect reallocation under § 482 is a difficult 
task for U.S. tax authorities. Traditional discovery methods in 
litigation yield little evidence of probative value relative to 
establishing control under § 482. 
Although non-tariff trade barriers to United States compa-
nies entering Japanese markets are the primary focus of 
keiretsu concerns,68 the subtle, and at times not so subtle, ero-
sion of the United States tax base is also a real concern. The 
underlying conflict between Japan and the United States in 
this area stems from basic cultural differences - the Japanese 
industrial policy which favors the monopolistic market and 
United States antimonopoly policy which promotes competitive 
65. Id .. 
66. Id .. 
67. There are approximately six major groups of this type in Japan. Each tries 
to have a major company in each sector of the economy. The system thrives on 
cross-shareholding, thereby allowing managers to focus on long-term strategy in-
stead of short-term financial performance. 
68. Clyde v. Prestowitz, Jr., How We Allowed Japan to Take the Lead, TRAD-
ING PLACES, 48-61, 157 (1988). 
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markets.69 Although the United States has challenged the 
keiretsu through the Structural Impediments Initiative and the 
Clinton administration's bilateral trade framework, little prog-
ress has been made to date.70 
VII. SOLVING THE TRANSFER PRICING PROBLEM 
The United States government has yet to discover "the" 
solution to the potential abuses inherent in transfer pricing. 
The issue is a two-edged sword. Overzealousness by U.S. tax 
authorities can create double tax burdens for U.S. t¥payers, 
stifle economic growth in the United States, and antagonize 
treaty partners. United States taxpayers, faced with the prob-
lem of double taxation are forced to resort to expensive and 
frustrating competent authority procedures. Conversely, inef-
fective enforcement of the reallocation provisions of § 482 re-
duces the amount of income taxes collected and exacerbates 
the United States' budget deficit problems. 
The United States' solution to transfer pricing issues must, 
of necessity, be a global solution. The ultimate goal in solving 
these problems must be to allocate revenue geographically 
among competing tax jurisdictions.71 Cultural differences be-
tween countries, such as the United States and Japan, are not 
going to disappear and these differences must be factored into 
any global solution fashioned. Bilateral attempts by the United 
States to address the problem only from its domestic perspec-
tive are ultimately doomed to failure in the global context. 
The United States may reach agreement with a taxpayer 
as to the transfer pricing methodology to be used for particular 
goods, but a problem will still exist if the taxpayer's foreign tax 
jurisdiction does not agree with the pricing methodology of the 
United States. Such a situation would create double taxation 
69. Bader, supra note 54, at 376. 
70. United States·Japan Structural Impediments Initiative: Hearings Before the 
Senate Subcomm. on International Trade of the Comm. on Finance, lOlst Cong., 
1st Sess., pt. 2, at 1-2 (1992). 
71. Dale W. Wickham & Charles J. Kerester, New Directions Needed for Solu-
tion of the International Transfer Pricing Tax Puzzle: Internationally Agreed Rules 
or Tax Warfare?, 56 TAX NOTES 339, 342 (1992) (contending that concentration on 
allocation methods ignores source issues). 
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burdens for the taxpayer and the necessity for competent au-
thority intervention. Even with competent authority involve-
ment there is no assurance that multilateral agreement will be 
reached retrospectively. The attempts, however, to reach 
agreements prospectively regarding transfer pricing issues 
should be expanded as part of this global solution. 
The United States has attempted to address the transfer 
pricing problem over the last 35 years from the arm's length 
standard approach. This approach, although now the norm in 
the international community, has significant inherent prob-
lems in its administration. Documentation in foreign jurisdic-
tions is difficult, if not impossible, to obtain. Many times there 
is no comparable sale to provide a basis for determining the 
arm's length transfer price. Section 482 of the Tax Reform Act 
of 1986 provides a manner to determine the income attribut-
able to an intangible asset which is commensurate with the 
income from the asset. This "commensurate with income" stan-
dard was developed to establish transfer prices for intangible 
property. 
Over the last several years an alternative long term solu-
tion to arm's length pricing methodology has gained support. 
The method is based on the adoption of a formulary approach 
to allocate the income geographically, and it is similar, in con-
cept at least, to the commensurate with income standard, 
where affiliated corporations are treated as a single unit and 
the income of the unit is apportioned amongst tax jurisdictions 
based on a formula. The formula would consider such factors 
as assets, payroll, and sales in each jurisdiction in relation to 
the worldwide total of such factors within the unit. 72 
An optimal long-term solution to transfer pricing issues 
would rely on a restructuring of the overall approach, and the 
incorporation of those current policies and procedures which 
are working well, specifically: 
• A formulary approach to the reallocation of income;73 
72. Avi-Yonah, supra note 28, at 153. 
73. [d .. 
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• International agreement on uniform rules of transfer 
pricing incorporating the formulary approach; 
• Continuation of Advance Pricing Agreements to avoid 
disputes, but with the binding agreement of all related parties, 
precedential value of the agreements, and open forums; and 
• Triangulation of the dispute resolution process74 in-
cluding competent authorities. 
This long-term solution would not be simple to effect. Al-
though the structures for advance pricing agreements are in 
place domestically and a United States conversion to a formu-
lary approach could be accomplished in a reasonable period of 
time, the real challenge in a global solution is convincing the 
other taxing jurisdictions and sovereigns of the necessity for 
global cooperation. Openness in dispute resolution and pricing 
determinations is essential to an effective worldwide system. 
Although the law itself in the Internal Revenue Code is 
rather straightforward, administration of that law has proven 
to be expensive and ineffective.75 Transfer pricing cases are 
very burdensome, time-consuming, and expensive for all par-
ties - the courts, I.R.S., and the companies involved76 - and 
there is no guarantee of ultimate success.77 The problem has 
not yet been solved. Mter 35 years of diligent efforts using the 
arm's length transfer pricing standard which have achieved 
only modest success in dealing with transfer pricing abuses, it 
is time to switch to a formulary approach in the United States. 
Global solutions to uniformity in transfer pricing issues, both 
retrospectively and prospectively, must be found. 
74. Clark, supra note 1, at 1209. 
75. In 1992, the IRS proposed over $4 billion, in transfer pricing adjustments, 
and as of October, 1993, pending disputes of transfer pricing adjustments involved 
at least $11.3 billion in tax deficiencies. See 1993 IRS Tax Enforcement Hearing 
before the Senate Comm. on Governmental Affairs, 103rd Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (1993) 
(opening statement of Sen. Byron L. Dorgan). 
76. Bureau of National Affairs, Tax Management Transfer Pricing Report, 135· 
36 (July 7, 1993) (In a recent transfer pricing case, Chevron produced 1.3 million 
pages of unlabelled documents for the I.R.S.). 
77. Avi-Yonah, supra note 28, at 150. 
16
Annual Survey of International & Comparative Law, Vol. 3 [1996], Iss. 1, Art. 8
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/annlsurvey/vol3/iss1/8
